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Abstract
In market modeling, one often treats buyers as a homogeneous group. In this
paper we consider buyers with heterogeneous preferences and products available in
many variants. Such a framework allows us to successfully model various market
phenomena. In particular, we investigate how is the vendor’s behavior influenced
by the amount of available information and by the presence of correlations in the
system.
Keywords: Market model, supply-demand law, correlations, matching problem.
1 Introduction
The standard economics textbooks make the supply-demand law as one of the pillars of the
modern economic theory. However, many people, especially economists (see for example
[1]), gradually realize that the most important factor is missing in the traditional supply-
demand law. The study of complex systems [2, 3, 4] has already led to novel approaches
to market phenomena. In a previous work [5], one of us introduced a simple framework to
treat both quality and information capability, yielding a generalized supply demand law.
However, in the previous paper, product is simply characterized by a single scalar variable:
quality. In the modern economy we face a much more complex world, where products have
many attributes and consumers have heterogeneous tastes [6]. These preferences cannot be
simply represented as price and quality alone. We therefore generalize the previous work to
allow multiple variants of each product as well as many different tastes among consumers.
Thus the producers face a dilemma: whether to target the average taste by producing
a single or a few variants to leverage the economy of scale, or to match precisely each
consumer’s taste [7]. We shall see that the answer depends on the information level that
the producers may access: whether they know, and how well they know the consumers’
preferences. In addition, producers face also the nonlinear production costs. All these
factors have to compromise to yield a combined result that gives various degrees of product
diversity. With our approach, the supply demand problem of producers with the capability
of producing variations and consumers’ diverse tastes becomes a matching problem [8,
9], where many mathematical and statistical mechanic tools are available to handle the
complexity of the combinatorial problem.
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In this paper we build a market model and investigate its behavior under various
circumstances. In the first part of the paper we do not consider correlations between
preferences of the parties included in the system. While unrealistic, this assumption allows
us to discover basic properties of the model and outline the way of reasoning which can be
used also in later, more realistic considerations. In the second part of the paper we discuss
correlations and the ways how they can be introduced to the system. The last part of the
paper deals with the consequences of the correlations for the model.
2 General framework: one vendor with many buyers
Let’s start with a market where only one vendor and M buyers are present. The vendor
can produce N different variants of a product (e.g. many different shoes). With regard
to the market, he has to decide which variants it is optimal to produce. We assume that
all buyers satisfied with the offer buy one item, others stay out of the trading. Buyers in
the market we label with lowercase Latin letters (i = 1, . . . ,M). The different variants the
vendor can produce we label with Greek letters (α = 1, . . . , N). The price of variant α
we label as Pα. We assume that every variant can be produced in as many pieces as it is
needed and as fast as it is needed.
The simple structure sketched above offers us enough space to model basic features
of real markets. To establish a mathematical model for the market we have to introduce
some assumptions about participants’ preferences and their consequences on the trading
process. To keep complexity of the model at minimum we assume that buyer’s opinion
about a variant can by represented by one scalar quantity, which we call cost and label
it with x; we assume x ∈ [0; 1]. The smaller is the cost xi,α, the bigger is the probability
that buyer i is satisfied with variant α when asked. Preferences of the vendor are easier
to introduce; they are represented by costs which he suffers during production and sale
of a particular variant. The cost for variant α we label yα and after a proper rescaling of
monetary units yα ∈ [0; 1]. To simplify our considerations, we arrange the variants in order
of cost: y1 < y2 < · · · < yN .
We stress a conceptual difference between vendor’s and buyer’s costs. The seller’s
cost yα is strictly monetary—it represents a real amount of money (although in arbitrary
units). In contrast, the buyer’s cost xi,α has no tangible interpretation, it simply represents
something as airy as happiness with the given variant.
The vendor is able to produce N different variants. However, when he is producing
more variants, his expenses grows due to need of an additional investment. The vendor’s
tendency to produce only few different variants can be modeled e. g. by a nonlinearity
of expenses (doubled production of one single variant does not require doubled expenses).
We adopt another approach; we assume that to initiate the production of a variant, the
vendor has to pay additional charge Z > 0 (this represents initial costs).
Now let’s assume that the vendor offered k most favorable variants (thus α = 1, . . . , k,
k ≤ N) to customers and the number of units sold of variant α is nα. The total vendor’s
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Figure 1: One particularly simple choice for the buyers’ acceptance function f(x).
profit is
X(k, {nα}) =
k∑
α=1
nα(Pα − yα)− kZ. (1)
Here the last term kZ comes for the initial costs of k produced variants, Pα − yα is the
profit for one sold unit of variant α. Due to the monetary rescaling used to confine yα to
the range [0; 1], units for profit, initial costs and prices are arbitrary.
It is natural to assume that when buyer i is asked about interest to buy variant α, the
decision is based on the cost xi,α. We formalize this by the assumption that the probability
of acceptance is a function of the variant cost; this function we call acceptance function.
Obviously, f(x) is a decreasing function of the cost x. Moreover, we assume f(0) = 1.
This means that if a buyer considers a variant to be the perfect one, she surely buys it.
When we offer a random variant to one buyer, the acceptance probability is∫ 1
0
π(x)f(x)dx ≡ p. (2)
Here π(x) is the probability distribution of cost x (i.e. it defines what “to offer a random
variant” really means). The probability p of accepting a random proposal is an important
parameter of the model. From our everyday life we know that largely we do not agree to
such an offer. For this reason we assume p≪ 1 in our calculations.
One example of a reasonable choice for the acceptance function is (see fig. 1)
f(x; p) =
{
1− x/2p (0 ≤ x ≤ 2p),
0 (2p < x).
(3)
with p < 0.5. This choice is especially convenient due to its simplicity. If we now assume
the uniform distribution of the buyer’s costs, π(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, parameter p of the
acceptance function (3) is just the probability p of accepting a random offer introduced in
the previous paragraph.
In the rest of this paper we assume that the prices of all variants are the same and equal
to 1, Pα = 1. This relieves us from many technicalities, and helps to highlight important
features of the model. Nevertheless, generalization to various prices is straightforward.
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3 No correlations in costs
We begin our investigation with the simplest case of the presented model—the market
without correlations, where all costs yα and xi,α are mutually independent. We model this
by costs uniformly distributed in the range [0; 1]. To keep variants ordered, we first draw
their costs and then we renumber all variants achieve y1 < y2 < · · · < yN . It follows that
after averaging over realizations, the formula 〈yα〉 = α/(N + 1) holds.
3.1 A vendor without knowledge of buyers’ preferences
If a vendor wants to discover which variants are most acceptable for buyers, in a market
without correlations each buyer has to be asked for preferences. This cannot be done in
big markets, thus it is natural to investigate the case with no information about buyers’
preferences on the vendor’s side. In sec. 3.4 we show that even an expensive global opinion
survey brings only a negligible contribution to the vendor’s income.
Without any information about preferences, the vendor is not able to discover which
variants are most favored by buyers. Therefore the best strategy is to offer variants that
are most favorable from his point of view. Let’s label the number of variants the vendor
is willing to offer as k. We assume that all these variants are available to buyers simul-
taneously, similarly to different types of shoes available in a shoe shop. Every buyer goes
through the offered variants and decides whether some of them are suitable or not.
From the buyer’s point of view, the vendor makes random proposals; the probability of
accepting one particular offer is thus by definition equal to p. The probability PA that one
particular buyer accepts one of k proposed variants is complementary to the probability
(1− p)k of denying all offered variants. Thus we have
PA = 1− (1− p)k ≈ 1− e−pk, (4)
where the approximation used is valid for pk ≪ 1, i.e. for very choosy consumers (than p
is a small quantity) and a small number of offered variants. Now the average number of
items sold by the vendor to all M buyers is MPA. Since no correlations are present, the
average number of items sold of variant α is 〈nα〉 =MPA/k, it is a decreasing function of
k.
The quantity of vendor’s interest is the total profit X introduced in (1). Its expected
value can be found using 〈nα〉, 〈yα〉, and PA. We obtain
XU(k) = M
(
1− e−pk)(1− 1 + k
2(N + 1)
)
− kZ. (5)
Here the subscript U reminds that we are dealing with an “uninformed” vendor. This
function is sketched in fig. 2 for three different choices of initial cost Z. The optimal
number of variants the vendor should offer maximizes his profit. One can easily show that
when X ′U(0) < 0, XU(k) < 0 for all k > 0. Thus the condition X
′
U(0) < 0, which can be
rewritten as Z > Mp, characterizes a market where the optimal vendor’s strategy is to
stop the production and stay idle.
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Figure 2: Expected profit of the vendor without informations, XU(k), drawn against k for
small value of initial costs (solid line), medium initial costs (dashed line) and high initial
costs (dotted line). In the last case the condition Z > Mp is fulfilled and the optimal
vendor’s strategy is to stop the production.
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Figure 3: The optimal number of offered variants and the optimal profit as functions of
initial cost Z for M = 500, N = 2 000, and p = 0.05. Numerical results (empty circles) are
averages over 1 000 realizations, analytical results (solid lines) come from eq. (6). For the
optimal profit arbitrary units are used.
Since for every product numerous numerous variations can be made, the total number of
variants the vendor can offer, N , is large. Thus we are allowed to assume that the optimal
number of offered variants satisfies the condition kopt ≪ N and solve the maximization
condition X ′U(k) = 0 approximately. We obtain
kopt =
1
p
ln
Mp
Z
, Xopt = M − Z
p
(
1 + ln
Mp
Z
)
, (6)
where Xopt is the optimal expected profit, Xopt = XU(kopt). The used approximations are
valid when Z ≫M/N and p≪ 1.
In fig. 3, these results are shown to match a numerical treatment of the problem. In the
figure we see how the initial cost Z influences diversity of the vendor’s production: decreas-
ing Z increases differentiation of the vendor’s supply in full agreement with expectations.
We can examine this feature in detail if we plot the optimal number of offered variants
against Z for one particular realization of the model as it is shown in fig. 4 (thickness of
the lines is proportional to the number of buyers of a variant).
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Figure 4: Differentiation of the vendor’s production for various initial costs Z: single
realization of the model (no averaging present) with M = 500, N = 2 000, p = 0.05.
Vertical axis has no significant meaning, it serves purely to distinguish different variants.
3.2 Improvement of the vendor’s profit by a sequential offering
of variants
So far we dealt with a very passive approach of the vendor. While offering k variants to the
market, he had no influence on the sale. In consequence, due to the absence of correlations
in the system, every offered variant had the same average number of items sold. In a big
market this is a natural approach. While the use of advertising can promote some variants,
its treatment exceeds our scope.
In a small market a personal offering is possible. The vendor can promote favorable
variants to increase the profit simply by offering the most favorable variant first. If a buyer
is not interested, the second most favorable variant follows, etc. The average sale of the
first variant is 〈n′1〉 = Mp, for the second variant it is 〈n′2〉 =M(1− p)p and in general we
have 〈n′α〉 =Mp(1 − p)α−1. Hence the expected total sale is
k∑
i=1
Mp(1− p)i−1 =M[1− (1− p)k].
This is equal to the expected total sale MPA of the uninformed vendor in the previous
section. We can conclude that the vendor’s profit improvement (if any) does not come
from an increased total sale but rather from an increased sale of the variants that are more
profitable for the vendor.
Now we investigate the optimal number of variants to offer in this case, k′opt. Since
〈n′α〉 decreases with α, at some moment it is not profitable to offer one more variant and
the vendor’s profit is maximized. The corresponding equation 〈n′α〉 = 〈n′α〉〈yα〉+Z can be
solved with respect to α, leading to k′opt. When the total number of possible variants N is
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Figure 5: Successive offering: numerical and analytical results for the vendor using stopping
condition described in the text in the markets with various sizes (on horizontal axis we
have q ≡ Z/M). All numerical results are obtained as average of 10 000 realizations with
p = 0.05, N = 2 000; solid line represents eq. 7.
big, 〈yα〉 ≪ 1 and the term 〈n′α〉〈yα〉 can be neglected. The approximate solution is then
k′opt ≈
ln(Z/Mp)
ln(1− p) . (7)
This optimal number of variants to offer is smaller than kopt given by eq. (6). We can
also notice that when p is small, using approximation ln(1 − p) ≈ −p we are left with
k′opt ≈ kopt. This is an intriguing property—by the two different approaches we obtained
the same result. To compare k′opt in markets with different sizes, we plot it as a function of
Z/M in fig. 5. As can be seen, in a big market (M & 100 000) eq. (7) fits well a numerical
simulation of the system.
One can examine also the increase of the vendor’s profit caused by the change of the sale
method. Using previous results, the approximate formula ∆Xopt ≈ Z[1+ln(Mp/Z)]/(Np2)
can be obtained. We see that when the total number of variants N is big, sequential
offering results in a small growth of the vendor’s profit. Nevertheless, in a system with a
limited offer (small N) or with very choosy buyers (very small p), the improvement can be
substantial.
Here we should notice, that the stopping condition “income greater than expenses”
introduced above can be hard to use in practice. It is because n′α is a random quantity
and can drop to the disadvantageous region n′α < Z + n
′
αyα even when 〈n′α〉 is big enough
to cover the expenses. Thus for the vendor it is not enough to simply check profitability
of the sale of one particular variant n′α. Rather he has to take into account sales of all
previously offered variants. This is especially important in systems with a small number
of buyers M where relative fluctuations are bigger. This effect is shown in figure 5 where
numerical results for the vendor blindly using the stopping condition are shown for various
market sizes. Clearly as M increases, numerical results approach the analytical result (7).
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Figure 6: The optimal number of variants to offer (left) and the optimal profit (right) for
vendor 1 (solid line) and for vendor 2 (dashed line) against Z1. The initial cost of the
second vendor is Z2 = 5.0, M = 500, and p = 0.05.
3.3 Competition of two vendors
In real markets we seldom find a monopolist vendor; competition and partition of the
market is a natural phenomenon. To investigate the model behavior in such a case we
introduce the second vendor to the market. We assume that the vendors differ by initial
costs, which are Z1 and Z2. Again we do not consider the influence of advertisements and
reputation, albeit they are vital in a market competition.
The course of the solution is similar to the one leading to eq. (5). We label the number
of variants offered by vendor 1 as k1, the number of variants offered by vendor 2 as k2, and
we assume that there is no overlap between offered variants. The aggregate sale of two
buyers is MP ′A where
P ′A = 1− (1− p)k1+k2 ≈ 1− exp[−p(k1 + k2)].
With our assumptions about the equal status of the vendors, every offered variant has the
same average sale. Therefore both vendors gain the share proportional to the number of
variants they offer. Thus vendor 1 takes k1/(k1+k2 of the total sale and vice versa. When
k1/N, k2/N ≪ 1, we can simplify the expected profits to the form
X1(k1, k2) = M
(
1− e−p(k1+k2)) k1
k1 + k2
− k1Z1, (8a)
X2(k1, k2) = M
(
1− e−p(k1+k2)) k2
k1 + k2
− k2Z2. (8b)
Both parties maximize their profits by adjusting k1 and k2. The corresponding system
∂k1X1(k1, k2) = 0, ∂k2X2(k1, k2) = 0 cannot be solved analytically but its numerical treat-
ment is straightforward. The result is shown in fig. 6 where we have fixed the initial cost
Z2 to investigate how kopt and Xopt for both vendors vary with Z1.
We see that at Z1 ≈ 12 vendor 1 stops the production for he cannot stand the
competition of vendor 2. By putting k2 = 0 in the equations ∂k1X1(k1, k2) = 0 and
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∂k2X2(k1, k2) = 0 we obtain the expression for the value Z
∗
1 when this price-out occurs
Z∗1 =
Mp
ln(Mp/Z2)
(
1− Z2
Mp
)
. (9)
It is in a good agreement with the values found by a numerical simulation of the model.
Important feature of this result is that it depends on the initial price Z2 of the competitive
vendor—decreasing the production costs can expel others from the market.
One can notice that when vendor 1 tries to increase the profit by deliberately increasing
k1 (with the intention to increase the sale), the term −k1Z1 prevents the success of this
strategy. As a result, the vendors have to adapt to each other. In mathematic terms,
X1(k1opt, k2opt) ≥ X1(k1, k2opt). At the same time, the sum of profits is not maximized at
k1opt and k2opt. It is more profitable to remove the less efficient producer (the one with the
higher value of initial costs). This is an analogy of a real market where ruining (or taking
over) of a competitor can improve company profit.
3.4 An informed vendor
Now we would like to investigate the artificial case of the market where the vendor knows
costs xi,α of all buyers. This knowledge can be used to increase the optimal profit. We
start with a simpler question: if the vendor offers only one variant, how much the sale can
be increased by a good choice of the variant?
The probability that buyer i is agreeable to buy variant α is f(xi,α). Since costs xi,α
are random and independent, only the average acceptance probability p plays a role and
the number of users willing to buy this variant, nα, is thus binomially distributed with the
mean 〈nα〉 = Mp and the variance σ2 = Mp(1− p). When the number of buyers M is big,
we can pass to a continuous approximation and assume the normal distribution of nα
f(nα) ≈ 1√
2πσ
exp
[
−(nα −Mp)
2
2σ2
]
. (10)
The biggest value from the set {nα} (α = 1, . . . , N) we label as m. This is the number
of potential buyers for the most accepted variant and the vendor does the best when by
offering this variant. The probability density fN(m) (often called extremal distribution) is
fN(m) =
N√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m−Mp)
2
2σ2
](
1
2
+
1
2
Erf
[
m−Mp
σ
√
2
])N−1
. (11)
The multiplication by N appears because we do not care which one of all N variants is
“the most accepted” one and the error function term represents the probability that the
remaining N − 1 variants are less accepted.
Since we are interested in big values of N , we expect that the difference 〈m〉−M is big
in comparison with σ. Therefore we use the approximation Erf(x) ≈ 1− exp[−x2]/
√
πx2,
9
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Figure 7: The relative growth of the vendor’s sale δ is drawn against the total number of
buyers M . Solid lines represent the analytical result, outcomes from numerical simulations
are shown as symbols.
which is valid for x ≫ 1. When the error function value is close to one, we can also use
the approximation (1− x)N ≈ exp[−Nx] (x≪ 1) to obtain
fN (m) ≈ N√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m−Mp)
2
2σ2
− σN√
2π
exp
[− (m−Mp)2/2σ2]
m−Mp
]
.
This form is too complicated to obtain an analytical result for 〈m〉. Instead we compute
the most probable value m˜
m˜ ≈ Mp+ σ
√
2 ln
σ3N√
2π
.
Here the first term Mp represents the average value of the sale and the additional term
represents the gain arising from the additional vendor’s knowledge. To get a better notion
about the sale growth we use the relative sale growth
δ ≡ m˜−Mp
Mp
≈
√
1
Mp
ln
pMN2
2π
. (12)
To simplify the formula, the assumption p ≪ 1 has been used. A comparison of this
result with a numerical simulation of the model is shown in fig. 7. As can be seen, a good
agreement is obtained.
When δ ≪ 1, all vendor’s information is indeed useless and the average sale improve-
ment is negligible. The inequality δ ≪ 1 leads to the condition
N2 ≪ 2π
Mp
eMp. (13)
Thus when the number of variants is not large enough, buyers’ opinions in the uncorrelated
market cannot be used to increase the vendor’s sale and profit.
From the previous results we can draw useful implications about the vendor with perfect
information, offering more than only one variant. When the total number of variants N is
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big, the number of variants offered by the vendor is small in comparison with N . Therefore
the average sale of all offered variants is increased at most by δ given by eq. (12) and the
same applies to the total sale. However, the vendor is interested mainly in his profit. When
we take into account different costs yα of variants, the resulting growth of the income due
to the informations is even smaller than δ because the variant with the highest sale can
have a high cost for the vendor. Thus condition (13) is has more general consequences. It
specifies the circumstances when even the perfect information about buyers’ preferences
do not help the vendor to achieve a significant improvement of his profit.
4 Correlations in the system
Now we would like to add one important flavor to the model—correlations. They arise
from conformity of people’s tastes (buyer-buyer correlations) and from the fact that high
quality preferred by buyers results in high costs on the vendor’s side (buyer-vendor anticor-
relations). To approach the behavior of a real market, we investigate how these correlations
influence our results obtained so far. Before doing so, we briefly discuss correlations from
a general point of view.
4.1 Measures of correlations
A correlation is the degree to which two or more quantities are associated. We shall discuss
different ways how to measure correlations and how to introduce them to the system. In
particular, we would like to measure the correlation between two lists (vectors) of costs:
~xi and ~xj (two buyers) or ~xi and ~y (a buyer and the vendor). All lists of our interest have
length N and contain real numbers between 0 and 1. A common choice for the correlation
measure is Pearson’s correlation coefficient r. For lists ~x and ~y it is defined as
r2 =
[∑N
α=1(xα − x)(yα − y)
]2
∑N
α=1(xα − x)2
∑N
α=1(yα − y)2
. (14)
This measure is sensitive to non-linear transformations of values in lists ~x and ~y. In
addition, since it originates in the least-square fitting of the data by a straight line, it
measures only a linear correlation. For this reasons, in this work we use another correlation
measure, Kendall’s tau. For lists ~x and ~y it is given by the formula
τ =
2
N(N − 1)
∑
α<β
σαβ , σαβ = sgn [(xα − xβ)(yα − yβ)] (15)
and it ranges from +1 (exactly the same ordering of lists ~x and ~y) to −1 (reverse order-
ing of lists); uncorrelated lists have τ = 0. Notably, Kendall’s tau is insensitive to all
monotonic mappings of the data. This is the strongest property we can expect from a
correlation measure—more general transformations, nonmonotonic mappings, can sweep
out any structure present in the data.
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Figure 8: The upper bound Mm as a function of τ0 for two different lengths of lists N . In
both cases the upper bound Mm is the same over a large part of the region τ0 < 0 and
drops to 1 when τ0 → 1.
4.2 Lists with a given correlation degree
Now we would like to construct a set of lists that have mutual values of Kendall’s tau
equal to τ0. Such a set would represent lists of buyers’ preferences in an equally dispersed
society. Since buyers’ tastes are to a certain extent similar, we expect positive correlations
with τ0 > 0. Nevertheless, in the following discussion we do not confine ourself to this
region.
First we address a different question. Let’s assume that between lists 1 and 2 there is
τ12, between lists 1 and 3 there is τ13. Does it imply any constraints on τ23? The answer
is yes. It can be shown (see Appendix A) that τ23 fulfills the inequality
|τ12 + τ13| − 1 ≤ τ23 ≤ 1− |τ12 − τ13|, (16)
which is an analogy of the triangular inequality for side lengths of a triangle. From (16)
we can draw various simple conclusions. First, if we want to construct three lists which
have pairwisely τ0, it is possible only for −1/3 ≤ τ0 ≤ 1.1 Thus it is impossible to have
more than two lists which are perfectly anticorrelated. Another simple result is that when
τ12 = −1, inevitably τ23 = −τ13.
Now the question is whether we are able to create the whole system of M lists which
all have pairwisely Kendall’s tau equal to τ0. The answer depends on the magnitude of M .
It can be shown (see appendix C) that the upper bound for M is
Mm =
{
2 + log2
(1−τ0)(N−1)N
4
(τ0 ≥ 0),
min
[
2 + log2
(1−τ0)(N−1)N
4
, 2 log2
1−τ0
−τ0
]
(τ0 < 0).
(17)
As can be seen in fig. 8, this quantity grows slowly with the list length N . Therefore
to model a market with a large number of equally correlated buyers we would need an
enormous number of possible variants.
1An example for lists with the pairwise value τ0 = −1/3: x1 = {3, 2, 1}, x2 = {2, 1, 3} and x3 = {1, 3, 2}.
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4.3 Generation of correlated lists
In the previous paragraphs we found that the society with a fixed mutual correlation degree
of buyers is limited in its size. Therefore to introduce correlations to the presented market
model we need a different approach. While copulas represent a general tool (see e.g. [10,
11]), they are useful mainly for numerical simulations and offer only small possibilities for
analytical results. Here we adopt a simpler way to generate correlated lists.
Let’s consider the lists of variables
xi,α = (1− t) ai,α + t cα, (18a)
yα = (1− t) bα + st cα + t
2
(1− s), (18b)
where ai,α, bα and cα are independent random variables uniformly distributed in the range
[0; 1]. Here s = ±1 indicates correlation/anticorrelation between ~xi and ~y and t ∈ [0; 1] is
the binding parameter controlling strength of the correlation: t = 0 leads to uncorrelated
lists, t = 1 to perfectly correlated (s = 1) or anticorrelated (s = −1) lists. In all cases,
values xi,α, yα lie in the range [0; 1].
For the lists defined above, it can be shown that (see appendix B)
〈τxy〉 = s 〈τxx〉, 〈τxx〉 =
{
u2
15
(
10− 6u+ u2) (u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15− 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1),
(19)
where t/(1 − t) ≡ u. Plots of 〈τxx〉 and 〈τxy〉 are shown in fig. 9. Since buyers’ lists are
prepared using the same formula, the average value of their correlation is non-negative.
Notably, for any value of τ we can find suitable s and t that produce lists with the expected
correlation equal to τ .
Lists created using eq. (18) do not have fixed mutual correlation, its actual value fluc-
tuates around the mean value given by (19). According to the law of large numbers, f(τ)
is normally distributed. In appendix B it is shown that the variance of τ is proportional
to 1/N . Such fluctuations are negligible for long lists. We can conclude eq. (18) present a
way to create a system with the desired amount of correlation τ for any τ , M and N ≫ 1.
Yet there is a hitch in the proposed construction of correlated lists. The parameter t
influences the distribution of costs: for t = 0 or t = 1 they are distributed uniformly, for
t = 0.5 f(x) has a tent shape. This is an implausible property: the changes of the cost
distributions can drive or distract the phenomena we are interested in. To fix this problem
we propose the following two solutions.
First, to obtain correlated lists we can use the formulae
xi,α =
1
2
+ st
(
α− 1
N − 1 −
1
2
)
+ (1− t)
(
si,α − 1
2
)
, yα =
α− 1
N − 1 , (20)
where sα,j is a random quantity distributed uniformly in the range [0; 1]. The complicated
form of the xi,α has a simple meaning. The vendor’s costs grow uniformly with α and
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buyers’ costs are connected to the vendor’s by the parameter t ∈ [0; 1]. The term propor-
tional to 1 − t introduces a noise to the system, resulting in differences between buyers’
and vendor’s lists. Finally, the term 1/2 represents the average value of buyers’ costs. It
is easy to check that xi,α given by (20) is confined to the range [0; 1] for every t ∈ [0; 1]
and s = ±1. The overall distribution of costs is uniform in the range [0; 1] and thus we
avoid the problems of eq. (18). Moreover, this construction is simple enough to tract the
proposed model analytically.
Using the techniques shown in appendix B we can find Kendall’s tau in this case. In
the limit N →∞ one obtains
〈τxy〉 =
{
s
6
(
4u− u2) (u ≤ 1),
s
6
(
6− 4
u
+ 1
u2
)
(u > 1),
(21a)
〈τxx〉 =
{
u2
15
(
10− 6u+ u2) (u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15− 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1),
(21b)
where again u ≡ t/(1 − t). The form of 〈τxx〉 is identical with (19) found before for a
different construction of correlated lists.
As we will see later, eq. (20) is not appropriate to produce anticorrelated lists. Hence
we present one more approach here—less accessible to analytical computation but more
robust. The normal distribution is stable with respect to addition of random variables and
this motivates us to make the following choice
xi,α =
√
1− t ai,α +
√
t cα, (22a)
yα =
√
1− t bα + s
√
t cα (22b)
where ai,α, bα, cα are drawn from the standard normal distribution. It can be shown
2 that
in this case
〈τxx〉 = 2
π
arcsin t, 〈τxy〉 = s 〈τxx〉. (23)
The course of 〈τxx〉 is shown in fig. 9.
As our market model assumes costs confined to the range [0; 1], the costs given by (22)
have to be transformed using the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution Φ(x). In this way we obtain
xˆi,α = Φ
−1(xi,α), yˆα = Φ
−1(yα). (24)
Since this transformation is monotonic, it does not affect the value of 〈τ〉 and we can use
eq. (23) for transformed lists of costs.
2In the derivation, the following formula is useful∫
∞
0
e−px
2
Erf(ax) Erf(bx) dx =
1√
pip
arctan
[
ab/
√
p(a2 + b2 + p)
]
.
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Figure 9: The dependence of 〈τ〉 on t for the proposed constructions of correlated lists.
5 A market with correlations
When we discussed the market without correlations, the probability distribution of the
variant cost πα(xi,α) was independent of α. Consequently, the probability of accepting
variant α
PA(α) =
∫
D
πα(xi,α)f(xi,α)dxi,α (25)
was also independent of α (we labeled PA ≡ p). As a result, when we change the acceptance
function f(x) while preserving the quantity
∫ 1
0
π(x)f(x)dx, the derived results remain
unchanged.
In the presence of correlations we witness a very different picture: the detailed shape
of the acceptance function f(x) is important. To keep the algebra as simple as possible,
from now on we adopt the simplest choice for f(x): the step function f(x) = 1−Θ(x− p).
This means that a buyer accepts a proposed variant only when its cost is smaller than p.
In the following we first deal with the market where costs are given by eq. (20) for it is
more accessible to analytical treatment. Then we shortly present analytical results for the
market where to introduce correlations, eq. (22) is used.
5.1 An uninformed vendor in a market with correlations
Here we assume cost correlations created using eq. (20). When the vendor has no informa-
tion about the preferences of buyers, similarly to sec. 3.1 the best strategy is to produce
vendor’s most favorable variants. First we focus on the case of positive correlations; in
(20) we set s = 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Using (25) and the chosen step acceptance function f(x),
the probability that one buyer accepts variant α is
PA(α) =


0 1 + (N − 1) p
t
< α,
1
1−t
[
p− t α−1
N−1
]
1 + (N − 1)p+t−1
t
< α < 1 + (N − 1) p
t
,
1 α < 1 + (N − 1)p+t−1
t
.
(26)
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Since we expect the total number of variants N to be very large and p rather small, the
second region makes the major contribution and thus we simplify eq. (26) to PA(α) ≈
(p− tα/n)/(1− t).
We assume that the vendor is simultaneously offering his k most favorable variants.
The probability that one buyer denies all offered variants is
PD(k) =
k∏
α=1
[
1− PA(α)
]
=
k∏
α=1
(
1− p
1− t
)(
1 +
tα
N(1− t+ p)
)
. (27)
Since N is big, we use the approximation 1 − x ≈ exp[−x] to evaluate this expression
analytically, leading to
PD(k) ≈
(
1− p
1− t
)k k∏
α=1
exp
[
− tα
N(1 − t + p)
]
≈
≈ exp
[
− pk
1− t +
tk2
2N(1− t+ p)
]
. (28)
Here we used also 1 − p/(1 − t) ≈ exp[−p/(1 − t)] which is valid when p/(1 − t) is small.
When this is not the case, denying probability PD(k) approaches zero and thus accepting
probability is virtually one regardless to the approximation used.
With respect to (20), the sum of expected vendor’s costs can be written as
kZ +
k∑
α=1
MPS(α)
α− 1
N − 1 ≈ kZ +
k∑
α=1
MPS(α)
α
N
. (29)
Here the first term represents fixed costs for producing k different variants, PS(α) is the
probability that to one buyer variant α is sold. Since the probability that of the successful
trade is 1− PD(k), from the condition
∑k
α=1 PS(α) = 1− PD(k) we can deduce
PS(α) =
PA(α)∑k
α=1 PA(α)
[
1− PD(k)
]
. (30)
This corresponds to the portioning of the probability 1−PD(k) among k variants according
to their probability of acceptance.
Now we can use (28), (29) and (30) to write down the expected profit of the vendor
offering his k topmost variants X(k). It’s not possible to carry out the maximization of
this expression analytically—numerical techniques have to be used to find kopt and Xopt.
Results are shown in 10 as lines together with outcomes from a numerical simulation of
the model; a good agreement is found for st > 0. Results confirm that positive correlations
between buyers and the vendor increase the vendor’s profit. This pattern is most obvious
in the case t = 1 when the vendor can offer only the most favorable variant and still every
buyer buys it.
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Figure 10: The optimal number of variants to produce (left) and the optimal profit drawn
against st for two different values of the initial cost Z. Lines show analytical results
derived above, symbols represent numerical simulations (averages of 1 000 realizations),
model parameters are set to N = 2 000, M = 500, p = 0.05. The decay of both quantities
for st < 0 is in agreement with eq. (31).
In the numerical results shown in fig. 10 we can notice one striking feature. When st < 0,
kopt changes rapidly and Xopt falls to zero quickly. Such a behavior is rather surprising
for one do not expect abrupt changes in the region st < 0 when there were none in the
opposite region st > 0. The reason for this behavior is simple—when s = −1, vendor’s
most preferred variants have cost too high to be accepted by a buyer. This effect can be
quantified. When buyers’ costs are generated by (20), the inequality xi,α ≥ t(N−α)/(N−1)
holds. Due to the acceptance function only the variants with cost smaller than p are
accepted. Therefore only variants with α ≥ αmin can be possibly accepted, where
αmin = 1 + (N − 1) t− p
t
≈ N(1− p/t). (31)
Thus with negative correlations in the market, the vendor is able to sell the most favorable
variant (the one with α = 1) only if p ≥ t. When p < t, the vendor sells no variants
α = 1, . . . , αmin − 1. Since αmin grows steeply with t (already with t = 2p one obtain
αmin = N/2), the vendor offering his top k variants has to offer too many of them and he
suffers both big initial costs and big costs yα. As a result the vendor is pushed out of the
market.
Without detailed investigation we can infer the system behavior when the step ac-
ceptance function is replaced by a different choice. In the limit of careless buyers with
f(x) = C, the influence of correlations vanishes and both kopt and Xopt do not depend on
st and the model simplifies to the case investigated in sec. 3.1. Thus as f(x) gradually
changes from the step function to a constant function, the dependence on st gets weaker.
In particular, if the largest cost x for which f(x) > 0 is x0 (for the step function x0 = p),
in eq. (31) p is replaced by x0. As a consequence, αmin = decreases and the steep decline
of Xopt in fig. 10 shifts to a lower value of st.
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Figure 11: The optimal number of variants and the optimal profit of the uninformed vendor
in the market with correlations given by (22) and (24). Numerical results are averages of
1 000 repetitions, p = 0.05, N = 2 000, M = 500.
5.2 An uninformed vendor in a different market with correlations
Now we switch to the market costs drawn using eq. (22) and transformed to the range
[0; 1] by eq. (24). As we already mentioned, this case is not allowable for an analytical
treatment—hence we present only numerical results in fig. 11. They agree with our ex-
pectations: when st = 1, for the vendor it’s sufficient to produce only one variant. As the
positive correlations diminish, the optimal number of offered variants grows and the profit
shrinks. A closer investigation of the vendor’s behavior in this case exceeds the scope of
this paper and remains as a future challenge.
6 Another trading model
In previous sections we presented a way how to deal with the trading process. Here we
shortly present a different model which arises from the same playground as our previous
reasonings but highlight slightly different aspects of the market phenomenon.
Let’s have a market with M buyers and N different variants that the vendor can
produce. Preferences of the interested parties are again represented by the scalar costs
xi,α, yα (i = 1, . . . ,M , α = 1, . . . , N) uniformly distributed in the range [0; 1] (thus again
we have no correlations in the system).
In a market, a vendor is aware that when some buyer is not satisfied with the offer,
she can choose a different vendor. Therefore every vendor tries to induce as small cost as
possible to the customers. This can be done by offering of the variants highly preferred
by many buyers. We can visualize the process by sorting preference lists of all interested
parties. Now when some variant is near the top of a buyer’s list, its cost is small and it is
favorable for this buyer.
We have to specify the criterion for the “variant preferred by many buyers”. First, it
can be the variant that is not too deep in nobody’s list. Thus, if we label the position of
variant α in the list of buyer i as ki,α and maxi ki,α as bα, the vendor chooses the variant
α that has the smallest bα. The selection process is visualized in fig. 12. Now the question
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Figure 12: The layout of the introduced trading model. Each column represents a sorted
list of variants’ costs (the most preferred at top). The vendor is willing to go down his list
by d, in consequence buyers are forced go down by some value b. Questionmarks signalize
that after sorting of all lists we do not know standing of variants in the lists.
is: how far buyers have to go down their lists? In other words: if we label b ≡ minα bα,
what is 〈b〉?
Since we have M buyers in the market, the probability of a particular value b is ap-
proximately given by the formula
P (b) ≈
[
1−
(
b− 1
N
)M]d
×
[
M
d
N
(
b
N
)M−1]
. (32)
Here the first term denotes the probability that there is no such a variant which is among
topmost b − 1 for every buyer and among topmost d for the vendor.3 The second term
responds to the fact that there is some variant which is exactly on bth place in the list of a
buyer (we do not care who it is, thus the multiplication by M appears), among b topmost
variants in lists of other buyers and among d topmost variants in the vendor’s list.
In eq. (32) we can use the approximation (1 − x)s ≈ exp[−xd] which is valid when
x≪ 1. To calculate 〈b〉 =∑Nb=1 bP (b) we replace the summation by the integration in the
range [0;∞] which yields
〈b〉 ≈ NΓ(1/M)
M
d−1/M . (33)
Here we dropped terms vanishing in the limit N →∞ (for there is a big number of variants
that the vendor can produce).
Since there are no correlations in the system, when the vendor offers his d topmost
variants, every variant has the same probability to be chosen by a buyer. Thus the vendor
has to go down his list on average by (1 + d)/2. On average this corresponds to the cost
〈y〉 = 1 + d
2N
. (34)
A buyer is with the probability 1/M the one that has the sold variant on the bth place
of his list. With the complementary probability 1 − 1/M he has this variant somewhere
3Since in one list each variant appears only once, this is only an approximate form of the probability.
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Figure 13: Numerical and analytical results for 〈x〉 plotted against d for various values of
M (N = 1 000, numerical results are averages of 1 000 repetitions). The analytical result
for 〈y〉 is shown by the broken line.
between the 1st and bth place. Thus we have
〈x〉 = 1
N
(
1
M
〈b〉+ M − 1
M
1 + 〈b〉
2
)
≈ (M + 1)Γ(1/M)
2M2
d−1/M . (35)
When the number of buyers M is large, this approaches 1
2
d−1/M . A comparison of results
(34) and (35) with numerical simulations is shown in fig. 13; a good agreement is found.
A small discrepancy for M = 1 can be corrected using the result 〈y〉 ≈ 1/(d+1) which we
develop in the following section.
To discover the scaling behavior of 〈b〉, one can follow a shorter path. The probability
that one particular offered variant is among topmost b in one buyer’s list is b/N . For
all buyers simultaneously the probability is (b/N)M . Since the vendor offers d items, the
probability that at least one of them is above the line is approximately d(b/N)M . If this
equals to O(1), the trading is successfull. Thus we obtain 〈b〉 = NO(1) d−1/M . This result
scales with M and d in the same way as the previous outcome of the detailed derivation.
At the end we have to mention that this model of transactions between the vendor and
buyers is not relevant for a high number of buyers because 〈x〉 decreases very slowly in this
case. In other words: when M is high, the probability that there is a variant that is not
worst in any buyer list approaches zero.
6.1 A vendor producing more than one variant
From the previous discussion we know that in a big market vendor can not insist on selling
only one variant. Therefore we would like to investigate a more relaxed case where the
vendor offers simultaneously d different variants. Then every buyer can choose the one
the most suitable for him or her. We would like to investigate, how much suffer buyers
in this case. To do so, we label the most favorable variant from the vendor’s offer for one
particular buyer b and compute the average value of this quantity.
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The probability that one particular value b occurs is
P (b) =
d
N − b+ 1
b−1∏
j=1
(
1− d
N − j + 1
)
. (36)
In this formula the product represents the probability that all d variants offered by the
vendor are in the buyer’s list lower than b − 1, the first term represents the probability
that one of offered variants is on bth place in the buyer’s list. Now we can derive 〈b〉
〈b〉 =
n∑
b=0
bP (b) =
n + 1
d+ 1
− d
(
n
d
)−1
≈ n+ 1
d+ 1
. (37)
Consequently, the average cost suffered by a buyer is given by 〈x〉 = 〈b〉/N ≈ 1/(d +
1). We see that M does not appear in 〈x〉. This means that the problem with the
improper behavior of the model in big markets do not appear in this variation. Since in
the calculation we did not make any approximations, no numerical simulation is needed to
check the result.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore the modeling of a market with inhomogeneous buyers
and a vendor producing multiple variants. We see that the outcomes depend on whether
one or both sides have adequate information about the other side or not. In standard
microeconomics, Pigou [12] has introduced the concept of price or demand elasticity. Ven-
dors, knowing the buyers’ reserve prices to pay and thus pricing individually, can reap
significant profit—this is usually called the first-degree price differentiation. Our analysis
can be considered as a generalization in this direction. We show that if individual tastes
are taken into account, there is much complexity in the system; treating individual tastes
with a large number of buyers presents a considerable mathematical challenge. Our models
point out a convenient way to tackle this type of problems and we expect that many real
economy-motivated problems can be analyzed in a similar way. Vendors and buyers have
many ways to improve their welfare.
In this study we have proposed two simple market models. While accessible to analytical
solutions, they exhibit many features of real markets. In particular, diversification of the
vendor’s production and market competition are used as examples. The diversification is
presented as an interplay between the vendor’s pursuit to follow the buyers’ tastes and
the costs growing with the number of produced variants. We also show that in a market
with many buyers without preferences correlations, the knowledge of these preferences
doesn’t increase the vendor’s profit. When correlations are introduced to the system, many
technical complications arise. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the expectations:
a positive correlation between the buyers’ and vendor’s costs improves the vendor’s profit.
Also, when interests of the two parties diverge (the correlation are negative), the vendor is
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able to make only a small or even no profit. In addition, in sec. 6 a similarly aimed model
based on the well-known matching problem is investigated.
As many other directions can be explored further, we do not consider this topic ex-
hausted. First of all, in a correlated market the vendor strategies and the influence of
information deserve attention. Furthermore, while in the present work we investigated the
influence of tastes on the market, the product quality and price were excluded from the
analysis. Eventually, the framework established herein can be used to raise the law of
supply and demand from a microscopical point of view.
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A Proof of τ-inequality
Let’s have three lists ~x, ~y, ~z consisting of N mutually different real numbers. Kendall’s τ
for lists ~x and ~y can be written as τxy = (Pxy − Nxy)/T where Pxy is the number of pairs
α < β that satisfy (xα − xβ)(yα − yβ) > 0, Nxy is the same with a negative result of the
product, and T = N(N − 1)/2 is the total number of different pairs α, β. For the given
values τxy and N it follows that
Pxy = T (1 + τxy)/2, Nxy = T (1− τxy)/2. (38)
We would like to find bounds for τyz when τxy and τxz are given. First we reorder lists
~x, ~y, ~z so that lists ~x is sorted in the descending order and for α < β it is xα − xβ > 0.
Such a rearrangement does not affect the values of Pxy, Pxz, Pyz, Nxy, Nxz, Nyz and thus the
values of Kendall’s tau between lists remain also unchanged.
Since now all differences xα−xβ are positive, from τxy we can deduce that there are Pxy
positive differences yα− yβ and Nxy negative differences. Similarly, Pxz differences zα− zβ
are positive and Nxz are negative. The values of Pyz and Nyz depend on the relative
ordering of lists ~y and ~z. The biggest possible value of Pyz occurs when positive differences
yα− yβ are aligned with positive differences zα− zβ (see fig. 14). By contrast, the smallest
value of Pyz (and thus the smallest value of τyz) occurs when positive differences yα − yβ
are aligned with negative differences zα − zβ.
From fig. 14 we see that Pyz and Nyz fulfill the inequalities
Nyz ≥ |Pxy −Nxz|, Pyz ≥ |Pxy − Pxz|.
Using Pab +Nab = T and (38) we obtain
T
2
|τxy − τyz| ≤Pyz ≤ T − T2 |τxy + τyz|,
−T + T
2
|τxy − τyz| ≤ −Myz ≤ −T2 |τxy + τyz|.
These two inequalities summed together and divided by T yield the desired inequality (16).
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Figure 14: An illustration of the proof. The first case (first three lines) has the biggest
possible value of Pyz, the second case has the smallest possible value of Pyz.
B Expected values of 〈τ〉
For lists created using (18) we can rearrange (15) as follows
〈τxx〉 = 2
N(N − 1)
∑
α<β
〈σαβ〉 = 〈σαβ〉.
Moreover, σαβ can be rewritten as
〈σαβ〉 = P++ + P−− − P−+ − P+− = 1− 2P−+ − 2P+− = 1− 4P+−.
Here P++ is the probability that both xα − xβ and x′α − x′β are positive and so forth, the
formulae P+− = P−+, P++ + P−− + P−+ + P+− = 1 are used. According to (18) we write
xα − xβ = (1− t)(aα − aβ) + t(cα − cβ) ≡ (1− t)A + tC,
x′α − x′β = (1− t)(bα − bβ) + t(cα − cβ) ≡ (1− t)B + tC
where A,B,C lie in the range [−1; 1] and are equally distributed with the density ̺(A) =
1− |A|. Now we have (t/(1− t) ≡ u)
P (+− |C) =
{
1
2
(uC)2
[
1− 1
2
(uC)2
]
(C ≤ 1/u),
0 (C > 1/u).
If u ≤ 1, the first case applies to all possible values of C, P (+− |C) = 0 is possible only if
u > 1. Finally, using
P (+−) =
∫ 1
−1
P (+− |C)̺(C) dC
with ̺(C) = 1− |C| it follows that
〈τxx〉 =
{
u2
15
(
10− 6u+ u2) (u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15− 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1).
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Figure 15: Construction of the set of lists with the given value of Kendall’s tau for T = 10
(thus N = 5) and W = 4 (thus τ0 = 0.2).
The quantity 〈τxy〉 can be derived in the same way.
The variance of τxx can be found by a direct computation of 〈τ 2xx〉. We have
τ 2xx =
1
N2(N − 1)2
(∑
α6=β
σ2αβ +
∑
α6=β
∑
γ 6=δ
σαβσγδ
)
.
The averaging procedure is straightforward. At the end we obtain
σ2τ = 〈τ 2xx〉 − 〈τxx〉2 ≈
4
N
(
〈σαγσγβ〉 − 〈σαβ〉2
)
,
where terms proportional to higher powers of 1/N were neglected. The variance is largest
when t = 0, for t = ±1 obviously στ = 0.
C System’s upper bound with a given τ0
To obtain the upper limit Mm for the number of lists that have pairwise Kendall’s tau
equal to τ0 we use a constructive way of reasoning. Without a loss of generality we assume
that in the first list all N(N − 1)/2 ≡ T differences xα − xβ (α < β) are positive. From
eq. (38) it follows that to maintain τ12 = τ0, in the second list exactly N2 = (1 − τ0)T/2
pairs have to be negative. The same holds for all other lists we would like to add to the
system, Ni = (1−τ0)T/2 ≡W is required for i ≥ 2 (N1 = 0 is fixed by the chosen ordering
of the first list).
To represent the way of construction we use fig. 15. The first list is represented by T
positive pairs there, second one by T − N2 positive pairs and by N2 negative pairs. We
would like to find a third list satisfying τ13 = τ23 = τ0. We already now that N3 = W
negative pairs have to be accommodated there. To achieve τ23 = τ0 it is necessary that
exactly half of the negative pairs in the second list meets with negative pairs in the third
list. This can be fulfilled in two ways (lines 3 and 4 in fig. 15) which also have mutually
τ34 = τ0.
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Now there are two important points to notice. First, the construction of the third and
the fourth list is impossible when N3 is an odd number. Thus for corresponding values
of τ0 there are not more than two lists that have mutually Kendall’s tau equal to this τ0.
Second, we have used purely combinatorial arguments here without taking care whether
described set of lists (e.g. lists 1, 2, 3 and 4 from fig. 15) do exist. Thus we estimate an
upper bound which cannot be exceeded but which can dwarf the real maximum by far.
Now we can continue with the fifth list where again N5 = W negative pairs are present.
Among them exactly N5/2 have to meet with negative pairs in the second list and also half
of them have to meet with negative pairs in the third and fourth list. This can be achieved
by lists 5 and 6 in fig. 15), their relative Kendall’s tau is also τ0.
During the construction process we divide W negative pairs present in the second lists
into two groups with size W/2 (lists 3 and 4), then we divide again and obtain lists 5 and
6 with groups of negative pairs with size W/4. Clearly, this sequence ends when we divide
the original number of negative pairs W so many times that we arrive at 1 which cannot
be divided further. Consequently, the upper bound we are looking for is the following
Mm ≈ 2 + 2 log2w = 2 + 2 log2
(1− τ0)(N − 1)N
4
. (39)
This formula holds when τ0 < 1 (for τ0 = 1, clearly Mm = 1).
In the previous construction, there is one hidden flaw. Since only W/2 negative pairs
in third list meet negative pairs in second list, to prepare lists 1, 2 and 3 we use altogether
W+W/2 pairs. If this number is greater then T , the third list cannot be constructed in the
described way and the limiting Mm differs from the previously found result. To construct
lists 5 and 6 we need together W +W/2 +W/4 pairs which has to be smaller then T . By
generalizing previous argument we can write down the inequality for the maximum number
of lists Mm
W +W/2 + · · ·+W/2Mm/2−1 ≤ T.
For Mm itself it follows that
Mm ≤ 2 log2
1− τ0
−τ0 . (40)
This limit is relevant only for τ0 < 0 (with τ0 > 0 we have W < T/2 and W +W/2 + . . .
is less then T ). As an actual upper bound, the smaller value from (39) and (40) applies.
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